crisis and, as it has for decades, ensured access to long term capital for local governments and public entities. Deepening of local public credit and working toward a Brazilian municipal bond market provide similar opportunities to modernize municipal management and increase growth. This implies overcoming outmoded ideas about fiscal dominance, the need for recentralization and biases against local public finance that have predominated in Brazil since transition from military rule, reorganization of sub-national debt in 1997 (CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL, 2000) , the imposition of fiscal responsibility legislation and hard won stability during the 1990s and 2000s (AFFONSO, 2003) . Today, the repression of municipal finance is perhaps the single most important unrecognized cause of slow growth and disappointing politics and local public management in Brazil.
This paper presents three diagnoses and a proposal. The first diagnosis is that municipal finance underdevelopment is the most critical bottleneck for Brazilian economic and political development. The second diagnosis is that steps toward a Brazilian municipal bond market are politically and economically viable, timely and necessary to reap the rewards of reforms and modernization that have won investment grade ratings for sovereign and corporate issues. The third diagnosis is that municipal bond markets abroad provide sound guidelines and clear benchmarks to free more effective local finance and design a Brazilian market. The paper concludes with a proposed timeline for mobilizing
ESSAYS
The great danger to self-government in the United States lies in municipal corruption, and municipal corruption is in large measure traceable to the manner in which cities have used their credit. The peculiar form of political corruption… is the flower and fruit of our generation, it is the natural result of endeavoring to manage a society according to the dogma of laissez-faire. This state of affairs, which is the growth of years, cannot be changed at once, but the evils complained of will certainly remain so long as we presume to think that the best thing to be done with a public officer is to lay him on a shelf out of the way of doing harm. Adams, Public Debt, 1890, p. 25, 375 
MUNICIPAL FINANCE UNDERDEVELOPMENT IS THE ACHILLES HEEL OF BRAZIL
Despite all the advances of e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s , r e c o r d capitalization of the BM&F-Bovespa market and creation of world-class financial regulation, the public sector and, especially, municipal finance have nonetheless been left behind. If recentralization (EATON; DICKOVICK, 2004) and fiscal dominance (BLANCHARD, 2 0 0 4 ) w e r e m a n t r a s i n t h e 1990s, financial repression of municipalities and decentralization must be mantras for the 2010s. Military government and protracted transition did indeed leave state and municipal governments open to capture by traditional elites (HAGOPIAN, 2007) . However, under constitutional government fr om1946-64, municipalities retained 10 percent of public revenue and were free to finance accordingly without requirements set by federal or state governments. L o o k i n g f u r t h e r b a c k , t h e municipality of Santos financed construction of canals in the 1920s by sale of 30 year bonds in London at 5 percent interest rates (MAURO et al, 2006) . Despite positive precedents from abroad and the past in Brazil, biases against public finance on the left and right have led to overemphasis on the private sector and repressed innovative local public finance management. Figure 1 Figure 2 . Since decline of public capital formation caused by the crisis of the developmental state in the 1980s, increases in private capital formation have been unable to produce higher levels of growth. Other barriers to growth certainly matter. However, municipal finance development provides an untapped alternative policy agenda for modernization of the public sector, increasing growth, improving public management and encouraging the emergence of a new generation of market savvy political leaders in local government.
The causes and consequences of slow Brazilian growth have been widely debated since fiscal and debt crises pervaded the end of military rule and transition to democracy in the 1980s. However, one observation seems clear. Brazil will be unable to sustain higher growth and financial deepening toward AAA ratings without modernization of municipal finance, where provision of most public services takes place and where participation of the private sector and public management modernization are most urgent. Underdevelopment of local public finance hamstrings growth and reinforces administrative centralization in state capitals and Brasilia, reproducing ineffective top down, command and control strategies of public management, increasing the cost of capital, decreasing the efficiency of the public sector and leaving private and foreign investment unable to improve local infrastructure. Since the 1990s, price stability, privatizations, liberalization and modernization of regulatory authorities have transformed the BMF-Bovespa into a world class stock market. However, the concentration of fixed income instruments in a very few number of bonds from federal and select state government entities limits portfolio and risk diversification, runs counter to public finance paradigms and best practices abroad, and reproduces the financial repression of municipalities. The rigidity of top down mandatory transfers and the inability of local governments to tap capital markets reproduce inefficiencies and throttle innovation. Modernization of municipal credit and local government bond issues do indeed present risks such as crony credit and market bubbles. However, with sound regulation, transparent market valuation and controls, the work of credit rating agencies, banks and risk analysts, independent advisory services and the entry of new actors such as bond banks and insurance companies, as a whole, are capable of providing powerful incentives and premiums for innovative municipal finance management while vetoing unsustainable projects. Corruption -1948 1971 1959 1983 2004 1953 1977 1998 1965 1989 1950 1974 1995 1962 1986 2007 2009 1956 1980 2001 1968 1992 Public (%) Foreign (%) Private (%) GDP Growth (%) Figure 1 . This indicates the current misalignment between tax authority and municipal budgets that leave local finance managers prisoner to requirements set in Brasilia mandating spending on health (12 percent), education (13 percent) and other programs often summing to 100 percent of local government budgets (ALENCAR; GOBETTI, 2008) .
The large number (5,564) and wide variety of municipalities in Brazil make the problem of rigidity in mandatory federal transfers and funds worse. However, this also suggests opportunities for 1948 1978 1963 1993 1960 1990 1975 2005 1954 1984 1969 1999 1951 1981 1966 1996 2007 2009 1957 1987 1972 2002 Table 2 ). F e d e r a l t r a n s f e r s m a y straightjacket local governments. H o w e v e r, a n n u a l r e p o r t i n g to Treasury required by fiscal responsibility laws and federal fund transfers helped modernize m u n i c i p a l m a n a g e m e n t . Municipalities have also explored new arrangements designed to tap private sector participation in local government through concessions, privatizations, sale of judicial deposits, publicprivate-partnerships (PPPs), a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e f o r m a n d securitization of receivables. However, these arrangements have had very limited success in large part because innovation has been stifled by the burden of managing federal and state transfers and mandatory programs. The vast majority of municipalities have thus not secured credit operations and very few have capitalized policies by contracting credit up to the limit of 120 percent of liquid receipts permitted under current regulations. Current regulations and procedures thereby provide a compelling point of departure for the modernization of municipal finance.
In sum, Brazilian municipalities have recovered from capture under military rule and delayed transition to democracy. Municipalities began to modernize under central government control in the 1990s and adapted to rigid fiscal responsibility legislation and detailed budget reporting requirements during the 2000s to manage a wide variety of funds and transfers mandated by federal government. Meanwhile, the value of municipal debt packaged by the federal government in 2001 has exploded because of astronomic interest rates. A more realistic renegotiation of the 2001 package is therefore another necessary step toward local public finance development (GIAMBIAGI et al, 2008) .
NEW PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT
Municipal credit operations and creation of a municipal bond market would reinforce the transition currently underway in Brazil away from old public management p r a c t i c e s t h a t k e e p c a p i t a l costly, slow economic growth and cause conflicts over central Frant (1996) described this as a difference between low-powered and highpowered incentives in the public sector. The high-powered incentives of bank loans and municipal bond sales provide promising alternatives to the shortcomings of traditional public sector hierarchies, the high cost of command and control bureaucratic management techniques, the complexities of legal contests in courts, and political control over policy currently enforced on Brazilian municipalities (WILLIAMSON, 1994) .
Municipal finance development does not mean that anything goes. Core principles such as debt affordability, competitive sale, due diligence and disclosure, investor outreach, infor med decision making by municipal finance managers, and services provided by independent financial advisory to avert conflict of interest are required to ensure prudent municipal debt management and avert moral hazard. Debt a f f o r d a b i l i t y r e q u i r e s t h e creation of independent advisory committees charged with writing annual reports on municipal budgets that publish calculation of debt serviceability scenarios. Table 3 reports the capitalization of major types of bonds in US markets 1980-2011. Municipal bonds (column 1) retained a sustainable growth pattern 1980-2011 (from 0.4-3.7 trillion US$) averting both the bubble and bursting of bonds such as mortgage backed securities (0.1-8.4 trillion US$). The trajectory of municipal bonds also stands in contrast to the increase of Treasury issues from anti-crisis measures since 2008 to over 9.9 trillion US$. Moreover, despite alarm and pessimism during the adjustment of local government budgets to the US crisis since 2008, no major default of municipal bonds has been reported. Levine (2009) suggests that the following characteristics of the US municipal bond market are most relevant for municipal finance development in Brazil: Subsidies from US federal tax benefits to investors; clear and shared accounting standards set by the Governmental Accounting  S t a n d a r d s B o a r d ( G A S B ) ; a longstanding record of repayment; a decentralized tax system; legal clarity about priority liens for debt; liquid secondary market trading; oversight by a variety of regulatory agencies and authorities; and informed independent credit ratings of municipal governments and entities. The historical development and current structure of the US municipal bond market thereby provide a series of guidelines for municipal finance development in Brazil.
Eastern Europe E x p e r i e n c e s w i t h i s s u e o f municipal bonds in Eastern Europe also suggest that clear limits on leverage, guidelines for prudent debt loads and conservative payout schedules, minimum enforceable disclosure standards (embodied in the US by SEC 15c2-12), use of annual amortization instead of balloon structuring, clear contracts for liens and recourse in case of non-payment for investors, establishment of transparent accounting presentation, and great care with initial operations to ensure success and provide benchmarks to accelerate diffusion are all critical lessons for Brazil. Eastern European experiences also suggest the importance of educating rating agencies, investors, banks, political leadership and the financial press to create advocacy n e t w o r k s t h a t m a y b e c o m e municipal bond communities. While small municipalities may not retain sufficient scale or experience for municipal bond issues, the pooling of credits and municipal consortia nonetheless provide alternative means for local public finance. Finally, municipal finance development in Eastern Europe counsels beginning simple and small (by avoiding complex bonds or structures) and that enhancing the protection of investors by pledging revenue are critical.
Emerging countries
Comparative studies of municipal bond development in emerging and developing countries also emphasize the importance of policy and tax devolution, the financial autonomy of local governments, the need for promotion of public finance modernization and the critical role of legal-regulatory frameworks. Martell and Guess (2005) report successful launches in South Africa, Poland, the Philippines and Mexico. Olenscki (2008:63-88) argues that Mexico was able to deepen municipal credit operations despite a shallow local tax base and many similarities with Brazil. Allen et al (2012) emphasize the importance of 'policy financial bonds´ in China. These bonds are issued by policy banks and held by Treasury, but invested locally similar to bonds in the US. International development banks have also reviewed experiences with projects designed to deepen local public finance (PETERSON, 1997; 2003) 
RISKS AND MECHANISMS OF CONTROL
Although further comparative analysis is required, these observations help clarify the challenges for municipal finance development in Brazil. The shallow tax base and rigidity of municipal budgets indicate the need for policy devolution. Credit to municipalities in Brazil is limited by regulations that cap loans at 120 percent of liquid receipts and debt service at 11.5 of liquid receipts. However, as noted, this provides opportunities because few Brazilian municipalities use the financial space opened by rules established in 2006. 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Modernization of local public finance is also fundamental for political development. During the last decade, consensus has emerged that negotiation of multiparty coalitions at federal, state and local levels is perhaps the most critical problem for governance in Brazil. The underdevelopment of local public finance transforms coalition formation and budget politics into zero-sum disputes, often involving use of amendments to steer funds toward preferential projects. The short time horizons of disputes over annual budgets lines imposed by fiscal responsibility legislation also reinforces the zerosum character of conflicts between legislatures and executives. Lowering the stakes increases the irresponsibility of local public management.
Deepening of municipal credit and finance presents the prospect of more positive sum collaboration and high-powered incentives b a s e d o n a c c e s s t o c a p i t a l markets and the private sector. New public finance management offers an alternative to command and control strategies, costly bureaucratic review and expensive prosecution through accounting courts and the judiciary. Credit and finance use market contracts as powerful incentives and credit ratings as premiums to reduce the transaction costs of municipal management. Benchmark credits and municipal bond ratings would build on a decade of reporting to Treasury required by fiscal responsibility legislation. Instead of being 'placed on a shelf out of the way' as described by Adams in the epigram to this article, municipal finance officers in Brazil would be free to innovate and gain recognition from markets, fellow politicians and voters. This modernization of local public finance and the deepening of credit and bond markets were critical for reducing corruption in US municipal governments. We argue that it may be so in Brazil also.
Proposal: Brazilian Municipal bond market
Recognition is now widespread that Brazil has introduced a series of successful economic and financial reforms and created world class regulatory frameworks, institutions and markets in banking and finance. Nonetheless, repression of local finance has made Brazil miss opportunities to direct capital movements toward public sector modernization and further increase the confidence of investors. The deepening of local public credit and taking steps toward a municipal bond market would tap recent reforms and free local finance officers to innovate. Fortunately, the record high interest rates of Brazil appear to be converging toward more viable international standards.
The timing for municipal finance could not be better. The current still very high interest rates of Brazil imply large marginal returns for startup and benchmark credit operations. We estimate the market for municipal credit within current caps of 120 percent liquid receipts and 11.5 percent of debt obligations at over six billion reals. Financial space therefore exists to increase the transparency, accountability, decentralization and modernization of the public sector at its most critical point -in the 5,564 local governments across Brazil.
This would help reverse the brain drain of talented managers to the private sector, increase the capacity of banks to deal with public finance and deepen credit and capital markets in Brazil. Municipal bonds are the missing piece to crown development of BM&F-Bovespa fixed income markets. This requires change. And while many challenges exist, it should be remembered that innovative credit and finance can quickly diffuse through relational finance management and pre-sale and post-sale events for education and training. This, in turn, would lead to additional loans on better terms that would further reduce the cost of capital for municipalities. Local finance modernization would also contribute to further improvement of Brazilian sovereign and corporate risk ratings.
The challenges and timeline for overcoming the separation of local governments from capital markets are summarized in Figure  3 . This figure represents paths for municipal finance development based on experiences in other d e v e l o p i n g a n d e m e r g i n g countries. Changes to the legal and regulatory framework of financial 
